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Mission Impossible:  New York Cannot 
Face the Future Without a Trade    
Secret Act 
Robert T. Neufeld* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself as a young entrepreneur whose fledg-
ling company just had its first big breakthrough.  One of 
your engineers serendipitously discovers a cheaper method 
of making a chemical compound.  The discovery promises to 
revolutionize industries, help your company get off the 
ground, and even make the world a better place.  However, 
your joy quickly turns to dismay when you learn that one of 
your fiercest competitors has been spying on your company 
and has stolen the new discovery.  This competitor also 
needs to survive economically and will stop at nothing to 
steal your company’s secrets and drive you out of business. 
 Although this scenario may sound like a tale of indus-
trial espionage gleaned from the pages of a Hollywood 
script, it closely resembles the facts of an actual case in 
Texas.1  In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher,2 com-
petitors of a chemical company hired photographers to take 
aerial photographs of a manufacturing plant with the hope 
of stealing secret information.3  Fortunately, the victim of 
this espionage was able to invoke trade secret law to protect 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University School of Law. 
1. See generally E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
2. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
3. Id. at 1013. 
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its proprietary information.4  Christopher highlights the prob-
lems facing companies, both large and small, that are trying 
to protect the valuable information that is integral to their 
economic survival. 
Trade secrets have traditionally been defined as “any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which 
is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 
know or use it.”5  The essence of trade secret law is that it 
provides rules of fair play in business transactions and stabi-
lizes the relations between otherwise competing parties.6  In-
stead of hoarding ideas and information, the owner of a 
trade secret is encouraged to share her knowledge through 
contracts and license agreements, primarily because she is 
assured continued ownership of the trade secret.7  This dis-
semination of knowledge results in increased efficiency and 
productivity for the entire economy.8 
Trade secret law a category of the larger field of intellec-
tual property.9  Intellectual property laws seek to promote 
creation and invention by striking a delicate balance be-
 
4. Id. at 1015-16. 
5. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). 
6. Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 121, 128-29 (1994) (“Trade secret laws promote ‘ethical’ be-
havior among competing businesses by penalizing misappropriation of a com-
petitor’s proprietary information.”); MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW 
HANDBOOK 1 (1983); J. H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation:  
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade After the 
GATT’s Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75, 77 (1993). 
7. Dan L. Burk, supra note 6, at 129, 131; JAGER, supra note 6, at 7. 
8. David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 61, 71 (1991) (noting the efficiency properties of trade secret law); Law-
rence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment of Com-
puter Software:  Reverse Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 72-73 (1996). 
9. Friedman et al., supra note 8, at 61-63; Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, 
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks:  Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 911, 926 (1990). 
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tween two important policies.10  First, the laws strive to cre-
ate incentives to research and invent by providing exclusive 
property rights in ideas and expressions of ideas.11  Provid-
ing a legally protected monopoly over a new idea or discov-
ery transforms intangible capital into valuable assets.12  This 
incentive compensates the inventor or artist for the costs and 
risks involved in researching and developing new ideas.13 
Second, intellectual property laws seek to promote free 
competition through the dissemination of information and 
knowledge.14  Inherent in this policy is a presumption that, 
in a free market, the open exchange of information and rig-
orous, unhampered competition yield the best products and 
ideas.15  Therefore, in exchange for granting exclusive rights, 
the inventor or artist must disclose her creation to the pub-
 
10. JAGER, supra note 6, at 4-5; Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confi-
dential Information Under Georgia Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 626 (1985) (discussing 
the “balance between encouraging the development of useful ideas and promot-
ing free competition in the exploitation of existing ideas”); Meiners & Staaf, supra 
note 9, at 913; Edmond Gabbay, All The King’s Horses—Irreparable Harm in Trade 
Secret Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 804, 815 (1984) (stating that the encourage-
ment of research and innovation is a major policy underlying trade secret law). 
11. Meiners & Staaf, supra note 9, at 913 (noting that exclusive rights prevent 
competitors from copying an invention without incurring any costs); Quitt-
meyer, supra note 10, at 626 (“[s]trong protection . . . creat[es] incentives for de-
velopment and innovation”); Graham & Zerbe, supra note 8, at 71-72. 
12. Graham & Zerbe, supra note 8, at 71-72; Meiners & Staaf, supra note 9, at 
913; JAGER, supra note 6, at 4-5 (“rewarding inventors and innovators with some 
measure of exclusive property rights in the idea”). 
13. Meiners & Staaf, supra note 9, at 913; see Thomas L. Hayslett III, Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property:  Harmonizing the Commercial Use 
of Legal Monopolies with the Prohibitions of Antitrust Law, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 375, 
378-79 (1996) (stating that intellectual property law provides supracompetitive 
profits to the creator as an enticement to innovate). 
14. Graham & Zerbe, supra note 8, at 71-72 (discussing the goal of enlarging 
the quantity of ideas in the public domain); Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 627 
(“Public interest favors the unfettered communication of ideas . . . .”); Burk, supra 
note 6, at 129 (“Trade secret laws also promote the sharing of knowledge by fa-
cilitating licenses under agreements of confidentiality.”); Meiners & Staaf, supra 
note 9, at 913. 
15. Quittmeyer, supra note 10, at 627 (noting the dangers of excessive regula-
tion and the need for free competition); Hayslett, supra note 13, at 376-77; Gra-
ham & Zerbe, supra note 8, at 71-73. 
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lic.16  These two policies are related in that their ultimate 
goal is the advancement of society.17 
The focus of intellectual property has been in the areas of 
patent, trademark, and copyright law,18 each of which is 
governed by federal legislation.19  Trade secret law, how-
ever, is rooted in the common law and historically has 
served as a backdrop to patent law.20  Interestingly, there is 
no comprehensive federal law governing trade secrets.21  
Rather, there exist distinct mixtures of common law and 
statutes regulating trade secrets in each state.22  Nonetheless, 
the increasing complexity of technology and information in 
the U.S. economy requires enhanced protection of trade se-
crets, a need which will only continue to grow in the twenty-
 
16. Graham & Zerbe, supra note 8, at 73; Thomas L. Irving et al., The Signifi-
cant Federal Circuit Cases Interpreting Section 112, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 621, 623 (1992); 
2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS:  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, 
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 7.01 (1996) (“The requirement of adequate disclo-
sure assures that the public receives ‘quid pro quo’ for the limited monopoly 
granted to the inventor.”). 
17. Graham & Zerbe, supra note 8, at 71-73; Hayslett, supra note 13, at 378. 
18. Friedman et al., supra note 8, at 61-63; see Daniel P. Powell, An Introduc-
tion to The Law of Trade Secrets, 23 COLO. LAW. 2125, 2125 (1994) (distinguishing 
trade secret law from the more familiar areas of patent and copyright law). 
19. The power to grant patents and copyrights is granted to Congress in Ar-
ticle I, sec. 8 of the United States Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Patent 
law is contained in Title 35 of the United States Code.  Copyright law is con-
tained in Title 17 of the United States Code.  Federal trademark law is set forth in 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127.  The Lanham Act is enforced through 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, as granted in Article I of the 
United States Constitution.  See Ethan Horowitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of 
the Lanham Act:  A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 59, 61 (1996). 
20. Friedman et al., supra note 8, at 62-63; ROBERT MERGES, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 953-54 (1992). 
21. Christopher Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 427, 442 (1995).  Federal legislation was recently passed criminalizing the 
theft of trade secrets for the benefit of foreign governments or foreign agents.  
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 1, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996).  
Nonetheless, this is not a comprehensive trade secret statute because it does not 
provide definitions of a trade secret and misappropriation and does not provide 
for civil remedies. 
22. MERGES, supra note 20, at 953-54; Gale R. Peterson, Trade Secrets in an In-
formation Age, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 387 (1995). 
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first century.23 
Trade secret law is unique from other forms of intellec-
tual property in that it is a hybrid of state property, contract, 
and tort law.24  Patents and copyrights, in contrast, are pro-
tected by the federal statutory scheme which grants these 
 
23. See Michael J. Mandel, The Digital Juggernaut, BUS. WK., June 6, 1994, at 
22.  Trade secret law is emerging as a vital field of law because it affords greater 
protection of ideas, may be implemented with greater ease, and is less expensive 
than other forms of intellectual property.  Powell, supra note 18, at 2125.  The 
Coca-Cola formula is one of the most famous trade secrets that has been success-
fully protected for over 100 years.  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 18, 22 (D. Del. 1985).  Compare, for example, trade secret 
protection and patent protection:  first, trade secret offers greater protection in 
that the issuance of a patent makes the subject matter public knowledge, whereas 
a trade secret maintains the confidentiality of the subject matter.  Meiners & 
Staaf, supra note 9, at 927 (noting that the success Coca-Cola formula and Smith 
Brothers’ cough drops attained would not have been possible with the limited 
protection of a patent); Lisa A. Jarr, West Virginia Trade Secrets in the 21st Century:  
West Virginia’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 525, 526-27 (1995).  
Moreover, courts may subsequently invalidate a patent, leaving the subject mat-
ter devoid of any protection.  See Peterson, supra note 22, at 386-87; Jarr, supra 
note 23, at 527.  Second, trade secret offers a greater period of protection:  while 
patent protection exists for only 20 years after the patent is issued, trade secret 
protection is indefinite.  The GATT Implementing Legislation has changed the 
term of a patent such that a patent granted on an application filed on or after 
June 8, 1995 commences on the date of grant and expires 20 years from the appli-
cation filing date, or the date from which priority is claimed.  See Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 531-533, 108 Stat. 4809, 4882-90 
(1994); Meiners & Staaf, supra note 9, at 927; Peterson, supra note 22, at 386-87.  
Third, trade secrets are more efficient:  maintaining a trade secret does not in-
volve the time and expense of processing a patent.  Friedman et al., supra note 8, 
at 63; Pace, supra note 21, at 437-38.  Finally, trade secret protection is more ex-
pansive than patent protection, as it extends to many forms of intellectual prop-
erty that do not satisfy the stringent requirements of the federal patent laws.  
Meiners & Staaf, supra note 9, at 926; Pace, supra note 21, at 437-38.  Trade secrets, 
unlike patents, do not have to be novel and non-obvious, and protection will ex-
tend to such areas as ideas, customer lists, financial information, and special 
training or knowledge provided to employees.  Victoria A. Cundiff, Protecting 
Computer Software as a Trade Secret, in SIXTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER 
LAW. at 7, 12-20 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course 
Handbook Series No. 444, 1996). 
24. MERGES, supra note 20, at 960; see also Peterson, supra note 22, at 387-88 
(describing trade secret law as a “marriage of tort- and property-based princi-
ples”). 
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exclusive rights.25  Trade secrets can be protected through 
traditional property rights, tort principles, or contractual 
agreements.26  For example, one may have an exclusive 
property right to knowledge and information such as formu-
lae, manufacturing processes, and customer lists.27  When an 
employee breaches an agreement and discloses trade secrets 
belonging to her employer, the employer can seek redress 
under contract principles.  Finally, if an employee violates a 
duty of care owed to an employer by disclosing a trade se-
cret, the employer may have a cause of action under tort 
law.28  This distinct mixture in the nature of trade secrets 
may explain why courts and legislatures have struggled 
with this area of the law.29 
Due to the lack of federal law, states have formulated 
their own trade secret law.  Using the Uniform Trade Secret 
Act (“UTSA”)30 as an impetus, over forty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have enacted versions of a trade secret 
act.31  These jurisdictions recognize that trade secrets are a 
valuable commodity which require laws to define, regulate, 
and protect them accordingly.32  New York is one of the few 
 
25. The federal patent laws are codified under Title 35 of the United States 
Code.  See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West Supp. 1996).  The federal copyright laws 
are codified under Title 17 of the United States Code.  See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-210 
(West Supp. 1996). 
26. MERGES, supra note 20, at 960; JAGER, supra note 6, at 43-54. 
27. See Meiners & Staaf, supra note 9, at 915 (discussing a private property 
rights approach to intellectual property); Gabbay, supra note 10, at 814-15 (advo-
cating a property rights approach to trade secrets when there is no trust relation-
ship between the parties). 
28. Burk, supra note 6, at 125. 
29. See, e.g., Rohn & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 723, 
751 (D.N.J. 1981), rev’d, 215 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 1081 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that trade 
secret cases “are not marked by any discernible consistency” and “vary quite 
widely”). 
30. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
31. Cundiff, supra note 23, at 23. 
32. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphics Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (stating “this is an important case because trade secret protection is an 
important part of intellectual property, a form of property that is of growing im-
portance to the competitiveness of American industry”); see also Reichman, supra 
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states that has not enacted a comprehensive trade secret 
act.33  Instead, New York courts continue to rely on the 
common law principles of trade secret law embodied in the 
First Restatement of Torts.34  Although these common law 
principles form the basis of much of trade secret law, the re-
cent widespread adoption of comprehensive trade secret acts 
indicates the inadequacies in these principles.35 
This Note discusses the outdated condition of trade se-
cret law in New York.  Part I explains the historical back-
ground and evolution of trade secret law.  Part II discusses 
the current state of the law in New York and other represen-
tative states.  Part III argues that New York would benefit 
from adopting a modified version of the UTSA.  Accord-
ingly, this Note concludes that New York should adopt a 
version of the UTSA, because doing so would greatly en-
hance the protection of intellectual property. 
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TRADE SECRET LAW 
Other than principles borrowed from English common 
law, American courts had little to rely on in fashioning trade 
secret law.36  Although case law on trade secrets was rela-
tively sparse throughout the nineteenth century,37 by the 
mid-twentieth century, judicial decisions increased as the 
importance of trade secret law became increasingly evident.  
                                                                                                                                  
note 6, at 80, 93 (noting that scientific and technical knowledge that cannot be 
patented or copyrighted is vulnerable to appropriation by free-riders); Melvin F. 
Jager, Illinois Returns to the Mainstream of Trade Secret Protection, 2 CHI. B. ASSOC. 
REC. 18, 18 (1988) (noting the importance of the Illinois Trade Secret Act to the 
state’s economy); Paul Thiel, Virginia Law Puts High-Tech Emphasis on the Protec-
tion of Trade Secrets, WASH. POST, June 30, 1986, at 3. 
33. Victoria A. Cundiff, The New York Law of Trade Secrets:  A Practical Guide, 
N.Y. ST. B.J., May/June 1995, at 32, 34. 
34. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939). 
35. See Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 
277, 282-84 (1980) (noting the incomplete and outdated nature of common law 
trade secret principles embodied in the first Restatement of Torts). 
36. JAGER, supra note 6, at 13 (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837)), 
27. 
37. See infra part I.A. 
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This part details the historical growth of this field of law.  
First, this part tracks some of the early trade secret cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court and various state courts.  Sec-
ond, this part analyzes the developments in trade secret law 
since the 1930s, focusing on efforts to harmonize trade secret 
law throughout the United States. 
A. Early Historical Development of Trade Secret Law 
Trade secret law developed slowly in the United States, 
yielding only a few noteworthy decisions from the United 
States Supreme Court prior to the 1960s.38  The threshold is-
sue in many early cases was whether trade secrets were le-
gally protectable.39  In 1889, for example, the Court granted 
trade secret protection for the ingredients of a medicine, de-
spite the argument that doing so would be a restraint of 
trade.40  The Court revisited trade secret protection of me-
dicinal ingredients in 1911, when, in Dr. Miles Medicine Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co.,41 it recognized that, while the ingre-
dients of a medicine do constitute a trade secret, such rights 
do not justify price fixing.42  Lastly, in the 1917 case, E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland,43 the Supreme Court 
upheld a preliminary injunction against the disclosure of 
trade secrets to experts and witnesses during a trial.44  Al-
though Masland was the last significant Supreme Court deci-
sion on trade secrets until the 1970s,45 trade secret law con-
 
38. See, e.g., Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John 
D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. 
Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
39. See, e.g., Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 97 (1889) (holding that a property 
right existed in the secret ingredients of a medicine). 
40. Fowle, 131 U.S. at 97. 
41. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
42. Id. at 402-03. 
43. 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
44. Masland, 244 U.S. at 102-03. 
45. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Aronson v. 
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
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tinued to evolve in certain state courts.46 
At the state level, trade secret law developed in a hap-
hazard manner:  some courts had numerous decisions, while 
others had very few.47  In many of the early decisions, state 
courts borrowed from the common law principles of English 
courts.48  As is the case today, most of the early controversies 
involved disputes between employers and their employees.49 
In Peabody v. Norfolk,50 one of the earliest state court cases 
dealing with trade secrets, the plaintiff, Peabody, sued his 
employee, Norfolk.51  Norfolk had signed a contract with 
Peabody, agreeing not to disclose information about Pea-
body’s secretly developed machinery.52  Norfolk subse-
quently left Peabody’s employ to work for a competitor and, 
despite his contract with Peabody, disclosed information 
about Peabody’s machinery to the competitor.53  The Peabody 
court held that Norfolk had breached the non-disclosure 
agreement, and emphasized three points in its decision.  
First, the court recognized the existence of a property right 
in trade secrets, regardless of patentability, and that such a 
right is not an unnecessary restraint of trade.54  Second, the 
court set a precedent by applying injunctive relief in a trade 
secret case, a remedy that was subsequently utilized by 
other state courts.55 
 
46. JAGER, supra note 6, at 26. 
47. See Jarr, supra note 23, at 531. 
48. JAGER, supra note 6, at 13 (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837)), 
27. 
49. Theft of Trade Secrets:  The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 
378, 382 (1971) [hereinafter Theft of Trade Secrets]. 
50. 98 Mass. 452 (1868). 
51. Id. at 453. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 454. 
54. Id. at 458.  There was an ongoing debate as to whether federal patent law 
preempts state trade secret law.  This debate was arguably settled in favor of 
state trade secret law by the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil and Aronson.  See 
Powell, supra note 18, at 2125. 
55. Id. at 460.  See, for example, in Pennsylvania, Fralich v. Despar, 30 A. 521 
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Finally, the Peabody court held that, although a com-
pany’s employees, in addition to its owner, may know the 
trade secret, the owner is still entitled to legal protection.56  
In so holding, the court envisioned a flexible concept of se-
crecy whereby an owner could disclose a trade secret to an 
employee in the course of business on a need-to-know ba-
sis.57  This third point is of particular importance because 
employees generally need to know a company’s trade se-
crets as part of their routine employment.58  Accordingly, 
were the Peabody court to have required absolute secrecy of 
proprietary information, it would have made trade secret 
protection a virtual impossibility.59 
Early trade secret cases in other states focused on the 
employer-employee relationship as well.  In Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Reichenbach,60 the New York Court of Appeals enjoined 
highly trained chemists from disclosing certain trade secrets 
they had learned while employed at Eastman.61  In reaching 
this decision, the court reasoned that the employees were 
under a contractual obligation to maintain secrecy, and that 
the Eastman Company had made significant efforts to main-
tain its trade secrets.62 
In 1897, the Michigan Supreme Court held that an im-
plied agreement to maintain the secrecy of trade secrets be-
tween an employer and former employee can exist in the ab-
sence of an express agreement.63  In making this 
determination, the court examined the measures taken to 
maintain secrecy and the relationship between the employer 
                                                                                                                                  
(Pa. 1894); and in New York, Champlin v. Stoddard, 30 Hun. 300 (N.Y. Ch. 1883). 
56. Id. at 461. 
57. See id. at 461. 
58. JAGER, supra note 6, at 15. 
59. Id. 
60. 20 N.Y.S. 110, 112-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892), aff’d, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1894). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. O. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140 (Mich. 1897). 
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and employee.64  Indeed, these are factors which courts con-
tinue to consider today.65 
As these cases demonstrate, trade secret law had rather 
humble beginnings.  Nonetheless, trade secret law fills eco-
nomic gaps left by other areas of intellectual property law.66  
This gap, combined with the increasingly complex and tech-
nical society of the twentieth century guaranteed a place for 
trade secret law.67 
B. Modern Trade Secret Law and the Drive for Uniformity 
Much like corporate or tax laws,68 favorable trade secret 
laws attract businesses to a particular jurisdiction.69  For ex-
ample, a state willing to protect customer lists as a trade se-
cret would be more attractive to companies with valuable 
customer contacts than a state not offering such protection.70  
This is particularly true in the modern global economy, 
where high technology, computer, and information process-
ing industries are growing at amazing rates.71  The signifi-
cant value of certain technologies and information correlates 
to greater importance for the laws that protect and regulate 
such assets.72 
The need for clear, standardized trade secret laws there-
fore intensified as information came to be recognized as a 
 
64. Id. at 140-41. 
65. See infra notes 77-130 and accompanying text. 
66. Friedman et al., supra note 8, at 64. 
67. See Klitzke, supra note 35, at 277. 
68. Numerous factors are involved when deciding in which state to incorpo-
rate, including tax rates, fiduciary duties imposed on officers and managers, re-
strictions on dividends, and shareholder rights.  LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., 
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 208-12 (3d ed. 1994). 
69. ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 1 (1992). 
70. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
71. See Mandel, supra note 23, at 22. 
72. Melvin Jager & William Cook, Trade Secrets & Industrial Espionage—
Online Piracy, in SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 
91, 93 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook 
Series No. 454, 1996). 
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valuable asset.73  The first attempt to establish general prin-
ciples of trade secret law was in the Restatement of Torts.74  
Although this attempt was successful in many respects, it 
was later improved upon by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL” or 
“Commissioners”)75 with the UTSA, a second attempt to es-
tablish trade secret principles.76  This section discusses both 
of these efforts in turn. 
1. The Restatement of Torts 
Paralleling the growing importance of trade secret law 
was the general need for comprehensive organization and 
standardization of basic trade secret law concepts.77  As 
noted above, early trade secret law developed haphazardly 
from state to state, with little guidance from the federal gov-
ernment.78  In response, the American Law Institute’s 
(“ALI”) Restatement of Torts (“Restatement”), published in 
1939, defined trade secrets and provided factors which 
courts should consider in determining whether certain in-
 
73. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990) (ex-
plaining that state trade secret law has not developed satisfactorily and recogniz-
ing the need for clear, uniform trade secret protection); see also Theft of Trade Se-
crets, supra note 49, at 380-81 (“Under technological and economic pressures, 
industry continues to rely on trade secret protection despite the doubtful and 
confused status of both common law and statutory remedies.”). 
74. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939). 
75. Trade secret law was not included in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
because the ALI apparently decided that trade secret law belonged in a separate 
volume.  The NCCUSL was organized in 1892 to promote uniformity in state law 
on all subjects where it is desirable.  The NCCUSL is composed of members of 
the bar from each state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.  Explanation, 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, 14 U.L.A. iv (1990). 
76. A third and more recent compilation of trade secret law is the Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION (1993).  This Note will not analyze the Restatement (Third) of Un-
fair Competition provisions on trade secret law because they are largely similar 
to and contemporaneous with the UTSA.  See Peterson, supra note 22, at 391, 397-
98, 429. 
77. JAGER, supra note 6, at 27. 
78. See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text. 
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formation qualified as a trade secret.79 
The Restatement defines a trade secret as any type of in-
formation which is used in one’s business and which pro-
vides an advantage over competitors lacking such informa-
tion.80  Examples include a formula, a process of 
manufacturing, a pattern for a machine, and a list of custom-
ers.81  Some of the factors a court should consider in making 
this determination include the value of the information and 
the extent of measures taken to guard its secrecy.82 
Many state courts looked for guidance to the Restate-
ment, the principles of which have been noted extensively 
throughout trade secret case law.83  Pennsylvania courts, for 
instance, looked to the Restatement in defining a trade secret 
as “almost any knowledge or information,” used in the con-
duct of business, which is held “in secret.”84  Other courts 
have also looked to the Restatement in determining that the 
required novelty for a trade secret is marginal and that an 
owner of a trade secret is entitled to legal protection of the 
information.85 
The Illinois Supreme Court cited the Restatement when it 
stated that “trade secrets may cover a wide spectrum of 
categories” and are decidedly fact dependent.86  Illinois 
courts have also determined that the essential elements of a 
trade secret cause of action are:  (1) the existence of a secret; 
(2) its acquisition in confidence; and (3) unauthorized use of 
 
79. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.; see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
83. ROGER M. MILGRIM, 12 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (1994). 
84. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1955) (applying Pennsyl-
vania law). 
85. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 
1974); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206, 212 (S.D. Ohio 
1981); K & G Oil Tool Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782 (Tx. 
1958). 
86. ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971). 
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the secret.87  Likewise, Wisconsin relied heavily on the Re-
statement for the definition of a trade secret and the factors 
to be reviewed in a trade secret case.88  As a noteworthy 
comparison, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that 
there is no trade secret protection for customer lists because, 
the court reasoned, such lists would be compiled regardless 
of an incentive created by the law.89  This is contrary to 
Pennsylvania law, which provides trade secret protection for 
customer lists.90 
Despite the success of the Restatement’s trade secret pro-
visions and its widespread acknowledgment in the fifty 
states, commentators have noted some significant shortcom-
ings.91  Such commentators criticize the Restatement provi-
sions as being over-complicated because they merely restate, 
rather than clarify, the common law and all of its subtle de-
tails.92  In addition, they argue that the provisions are not 
exhaustive and that they fail to adequately cover injunctive 
relief and the statute of limitations as related to trade se-
crets.93  Finally, by definition, the Restatement is a compen-
dium and serves only as a model.94  State courts may choose 
varying interpretations of its principles because they are not 
required to follow the Restatement.95  For example, most 
states reject the Restatement requirement that a trade secret 
be continuously used in business.96  Therefore, commenta-
tors largely agree that the Restatement falls far short of har-
 
87. See, e.g., Davis v. General Motors Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 218 (N.D. Ill. 
1977). 
88. Abbott Lab. v. Norse Chem. Corp., 33 Wisc.2d 445, 456 (1967). 
89. Corroon & Black v. Hosch, 325 N.W.2d 883, 885-86 (Wisc. 1982). 
90. Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 206 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
91. See, e.g., JAGER, supra note 6, at 39; Klitzke, supra note 35, at 282-83. 
92. See Klitzke, supra note 35, at 282-83; Peterson, supra note 22, at 392. 
93. JAGER, supra note 6, at 39; Pace, supra note 21, at 445. 
94. Klitzke, supra note 35, at 282-83; Pace, supra note 21, at 445; COLEMAN, 
supra note 69, at 19-20. 
95. Klitzke, supra note 35, at 283; Jarr, supra note 23, at 529-30. 
96. COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 20. 
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monizing trade secret law among the states.97 
2. Introduction of the UTSA 
Under pressure from the Patent Law Section of the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”), the NCCUSL responded 
to the call for unified trade secret law.98  In 1979, after ten 
years of study, the NCCUSL approved the UTSA.99  The 
need for uniformity is professed in the Commissioners’ 
Prefatory Note, which states that trade secret law had not 
developed satisfactorily despite its importance in interstate 
business.100  Furthermore, even in those states that had a 
substantial number of decisions on trade secret law, there 
was still “undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of 
trade secret protection, and the appropriate remedies for 
misappropriation.”101 
The UTSA, like the Restatement, is not law, but rather it 
merely establishes a set of model rules that states can either 
reject, accept in part, or accept in full.  The UTSA is similar 
to the Restatement in many ways because it “codifies the ba-
sic principles of common law trade secret protection, pre-
serving its essential distinction from patent law.”102 
However, there are also noteworthy differences between 
the Restatement and the UTSA.  The UTSA provides a new 
definition of a trade secret, the main elements of which in-
clude:  that the secret be information; that it have independ-
ent economic value because of its secrecy; and that reason-
able measures be taken to maintain its secrecy.103  The UTSA 
 
97. See id. at 19-20; Pace, supra note 21, at 443-45; Klitzke, supra note 35, at 
282-83. 
98. COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 22. 
99. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1980). 
100. Id. prefatory note. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. § 1(4).  The UTSA defines a trade secret as:  
[I]nformation, including a formula,  pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or  process, that:  
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definition is broader than that of the Restatement, and ex-
pands on the list in the Restatement to include “program[s], 
method[s], and technique[s].”104  Conspicuously absent from 
the UTSA definition is the Restatement’s requirement that 
the trade secret be in “continuous use.”105  As noted above, 
this requirement was rejected by the majority of states prior 
to the UTSA.106  Finally, the UTSA also protects negative in-
formation about research or a process that does not work.107  
Although this information can have significant commercial 
value, it was not protectable as a trade secret under the Re-
statement. 
The UTSA also diverges from the Restatement regarding 
trade secret misappropriation by creating two separate 
torts.108  The first tort is the unauthorized use or disclosure 
                                                                                                                                  
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or  potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not  being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other  persons who can obtain economic value from its 
  disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable  under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990). 
104. Id.; compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990) with 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). 
105. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990) 
106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
107. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990) (citing Telex 
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 423 
U.S. 802 (1975)); see also Cundiff, supra note 33, at 35. 
108. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990); see also COLEMAN, 
supra note 69, at 47-48.  Misappropriation is defined as:  
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who   knows 
or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper 
means; or 
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without  express or 
implied consent by a person who 
 (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the  trade 
secret; or 
 (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to 
know that his knowledge of the trade secret  was 
 (I) derived from or through a person who had utilized im-
proper means to acquire it; 
 (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
 
 
 
 
 
1997] NEW YORK TRADE SECRETS ACT 899 
of a trade secret.109  The second is improper acquisition of a 
trade secret, including computer hacking and industrial es-
pionage.110  Under the Restatement, a trade secret case could 
be based on both tort and contract law, thus leading to 
greater inconsistency.111  However, the UTSA bases liability 
strictly in tort law, which is more flexible and allows for the 
formulation of new torts without contradicting prior law.112 
Finally, the UTSA also responds to the two areas in 
which the Restatement was deficient:  injunctive relief and 
the statute of limitations.113  Injunctive relief is vital to trade 
secret cases where damages are often difficult to prove and 
money may be insufficient to remedy the misappropria-
tion.114  A plaintiff can obtain an injunction where he or she 
demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success or when the 
plaintiff’s harm exceeds the potential harm to the defendant 
if the injunction is granted.115  The plaintiff must also show 
that the public interest would be served by granting the in-
junction.116 
The UTSA sets the statute of limitations at three years af-
ter the discovery of the misappropriation.117  Rather than 
adopt a continuing wrong approach,118 the Commissioners 
                                                                                                                                  
 (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to 
the person seeking relief to maintain its  secrecy or limit its use; or 
 (C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or 
had reason to know that it was a trade secret  and that knowledge of it 
had been acquired by accident  or mistake. 
Id. 
109. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990). 
110. Id. 
111. Jarr, supra note 23, at 538. 
112. COLEMAN, supra note 69, at 49. 
113. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
114. Jarr, supra note 23, at 542-43. 
115. See Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video Ctr., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110, 113-14 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1985). 
116. Id. 
117. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990). If reasonable dili-
gence should have led to the discovery of the misappropriation, the clock will 
begin to run for statute of limitations purposes.  Id. 
118. The continuing wrong approach takes the view that for every instance 
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note that the wording of section 6 of the UTSA provides a 
fair opportunity to bring an action.119  Despite this reasoning, 
jurisdiction continue to conflict as to whether misappropria-
tion is a continuing wrong.120 
Despite the improvements the UTSA brought to the 
original trade secret provisions in the Restatement, commen-
tators also note shortcomings with the act.121  Critics note 
that, while the UTSA revised and broadened the definition 
of a trade secret, at the same time, it created further ambigui-
ties.122  The UTSA’s broad description of trade secrets as in-
formation is tailored by the requirements that it have “inde-
pendent economic value” and that it not be “readily 
ascertainable” by others.123  This definition focuses on what 
is known in the relevant industry, but the provisions are 
open to varying interpretations.124  The definition also fails 
to clarify the distinction between general knowledge and 
employee know-how.125  Regarding the areas of the law to 
which the UTSA applies, section 7 states, “this Act displaces 
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law.”126  The refer-
ence to “other law” creates further ambiguity.  A final short-
coming is that the UTSA does not fully address the question 
of remedies.127 
                                                                                                                                  
that misappropriated information is used, a new time period is begun for the 
statute of limitations.  Id. commissioners’ comment § 6. 
119. Id. 
120. Compare Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp., 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969) (rejecting the continuing wrong theory under 
California law) with Underwater Storage v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 
950 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (adopting the continuing wrong approach), cert. denied, 386 
U.S. 911 (1967). 
121. See, e.g., Klitzke, supra note 35, at 290-92, 305-06; Pace, supra note 21, at 
443-44; Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act:  The 
States Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 94-95 (1990). 
122. JAGER, supra note 6, at 39-41. 
123. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990). 
124. JAGER, supra note 6, 40-41; Klitzke, supra note 35, at 289. 
125. Jarr, supra note 23, at 534. 
126. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7, 14 U.L.A. 539 (1990) (emphasis added).  
The 1985 revisions to the UTSA attempt to clear up this ambiguity somewhat. 
127. See Jarr, supra note 23, at 544-45. 
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The UTSA came about in response to the need for uni-
form principles of trade secret law throughout the United 
States.128  Although disparities still exist, the UTSA has been 
adopted, in some form, in the majority of states and has thus 
made important strides towards uniformity from the days of 
the Restatement and the development of the common law.129  
The UTSA offers the potential for greater uniformity among 
the states and a model for the more contemporary problems 
in trade secret law.130 
II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF INDIVIDUAL STATE TRADE SECRET 
 LAW 
The desire for uniform trade secret law is evident from 
the efforts of the ALI and the NCCUSL.  Currently, the ma-
jority of states have adopted the UTSA, at least in part.131  
 
128. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a 
uniform trade secret law among the states and the impetus for the UTSA). 
129. MILGRIM, supra note 83, at app. AA. 
130. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 53. 
131. See Cundiff supra note 23, at 23.  For states with trade secret statutes 
modeled on the UTSA, see ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (1993 & Supp. 1996); 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-.945 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to 
-407 (Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (Michie Supp. 1996); CAL. 
CIV. CODE §§ 3426.1-.11 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101  to -110 
(Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-50 to -58 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
6, §§ 2001-2009 (1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to -510 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 688.001-.009 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (Supp. 1996); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (1995 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to 
-807 (Supp. 1996); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, paras. 1-9 (Smith-Hurd 1996); IND. 
CODE §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1-.8 (West Supp. 1996); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880-.900 
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431-:1439 (West Supp. 
1996); MD. CODE ANN., Com. Law I §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (1996); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08 (West 
1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (1996); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450-.467 
(Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1995); NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010-.100 (1996); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1 to :9 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (Michie 
1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
1333.61-.69 (Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (1996); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (1996); S.C.  CODE 
ANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 
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The remaining states’ trade secret laws consist of mixtures of 
rules from the Restatement and common law principles.132  
Of these states, three have considered, and rejected, the 
UTSA.133 
This part examines the current status of trade secret law 
in three representative states.  First, this part analyzes the 
trade secret law of two states that have enacted comprehen-
sive trade secret acts:  Illinois, which largely follows the 
UTSA, and Alabama, which loosely follows the UTSA, albeit 
with some significant changes.  The law of these two states 
serves as a comparative background.  Second, this part ex-
amines the trade secret law of New York, one of the few 
states that has not enacted any comprehensive trade secret 
legislation. 
A. States Following the UTSA 
Modern trade secret law consists of similar, but distinct, 
sets of rules in each state.134  Both states discussed below 
have adopted the UTSA, at least in part.  Therefore, unlike 
New York, these states have codified definitions of a trade 
secret, the elements for misappropriation, and the corre-
sponding legal relief.  The following examples provide a 
cross section of the varying trade secret laws among the 
states.  The Illinois statute provides an example of state trade 
secret law that closely follows the UTSA.  In contrast, the 
Alabama statute illustrates state trade secret law based on 
the UTSA with major modifications. 
                                                                                                                                  
37-29-1 to -11 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
9, §§ 4601-4609 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Michie 1996); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.108.010-.940 (1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (1996); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 1996). 
132. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (noting the lack of federal 
trade secret law and the common law roots of state trade secret law). 
133. The three states that have rejected the UTSA are Texas, Ohio, and New 
Hampshire.  James C. Lydon, The Deterrent Effects of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 427, 441-42 (1987). 
134. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
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1. Illinois Trade Secret Law 
Illinois joined the ranks of many other states in 1987 
when it adopted a trade secret law based on the UTSA:  the 
Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“Illinois Act”).135  For the most 
part, the Illinois legislature incorporated sections from both 
the 1979 and 1985 versions of the UTSA in formulating its 
trade secret statute.136  The Illinois Act largely parallels the 
structure and net effect of the UTSA,137 yet includes some 
modifications which generally favor the trade secret 
owner.138 
Beginning with the definition section of the Illinois Act, 
the statute and the UTSA define the terms “misappropria-
tion” and “person” almost identically.139  However, the Illi-
nois Act’s definitions of what constitutes “improper means” 
of appropriation and a “trade secret” do contain noteworthy 
differences from the UTSA version.140  In defining what ac-
tions constitute “improper means” of acquiring a trade se-
cret, the Illinois Act includes the phrase “breach or induce-
ment of a breach of a confidential relationship or other duty to 
maintain secrecy,” while the UTSA does not mention “confi-
dential relationship.”141  This addition expands the scope of 
liability beyond those people who have an explicit duty to 
 
135. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, paras. 1-9 (Smith-Hurd 1996). 
136. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, paras. 1-9 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT, supra note 30 and UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, supra note 99; see also Samuels & 
Johnson, supra note 121, at 52. 
137. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, paras. 1-9 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990) and UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 15 U.L.A. 433 (1980); see 
generally Jager, supra note 32. 
138. See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 52. 
139. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, paras. 2(b)-2(c) with UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2)-1(3), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
140. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 56.  Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
1065, paras. 2(a)-2(d) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(1), 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 
(1990). 
141. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 2(a) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
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maintain secrecy.142  The Illinois Act also adds, for clarifica-
tion, that “[r]everse engineering143 or independent develop-
ment shall not be considered improper means.”144 
The changes in the Illinois definition of a trade secret 
provide clearer provisions and broader protection of intan-
gible property than the UTSA definition.145  First, the list of 
examples of a trade secret in the UTSA definition is arguably 
exclusive.146  However, the Illinois Act contains the phrase 
“but are not limited to” before the list of examples it pro-
vides.147  This wording both increases the breadth of the Illi-
nois Act’s definition over its UTSA counterpart and estab-
lishes protection for a greater variety of information.148 
Recent case law demonstrates the broad protection that 
the Illinois Act offers.  In ISC Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, 
Inc.,149 for example, the court held that service manuals and 
 
142. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 56; see Stampede Tool Warehouse 
Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that misappropria-
tion does not necessarily have to be a physical taking, but rather can also be a 
copying or memorization). 
143. Reverse engineering is a process whereby one skilled in a particular 
technical field can take a finished product and disassemble it to discover the 
maker’s trade secrets.  See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 
(1974); Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989). 
144. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 2(a).  Patent law deters independent dis-
covery by an individual other than the patent holder because the patent holder’s 
exclusive monopoly would prevent an independent discoverer from profiting on 
the invention.  See Friedman, supra note 8, at 65.  Trade secret law, however, pro-
hibits only misappropriation of the secret and not its independent discovery.  Id. 
at 66-67.  Therefore, one is free to discover and profit from a trade secret held by 
another, as long as the information was not misappropriated.  Id. at 70. 
145. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 64; Jager, supra note 32, at 18, 21. 
146. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
147. Chapter 1065, paragraph 2(d) of the Illinois Act provides, in relevant 
part:  “‘Trade Secret’ means information, including but not limited to, technical or 
non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential custom-
ers or suppliers . . . .”  ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 2(d) (emphasis added). 
148. John Bostajancich & Patricia Smart, Survey of Illinois Law:  Intellectual 
Property Law Developments, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 855, 855-56 (1995); compare ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 1065, para. 2(d) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 
(1990); see also Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 64. 
149. 765 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
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technical bulletins constitute trade secrets under Illinois 
law.150  Similarly, the Illinois courts stretched the bounds of 
trade secrecy in Hexacomb Corp. v. GTW Enterprises,151 in 
which the court held that a trade secret can exist in a combi-
nation of characteristics and components that affords a com-
pany a competitive advantage.152 
The Illinois Act expands the definition of trade secrecy 
beyond that encompassed by the UTSA in other respects as 
well.  For example, the Illinois statute adds “technical or 
non-technical data,” “drawing,” and “financial data, or list of 
actual or potential customers or suppliers” to the list of ex-
amples of trade secrets.153  Indeed, prior to the Illinois Act, 
the status of customer lists as trade secrets in Illinois was un-
settled and often litigated.154  Some decisions considered 
customer lists potential trade secrets, while others required 
restrictive covenants or examined the customer relation-
ship.155  Nonetheless, under the new statute, courts have 
held that, although an employee’s general knowledge is not 
protectable, actual customer information learned during 
employment does constitute a trade secret.156 
Finally, the Illinois Act clarifies the secrecy requirement 
by foregoing the UTSA’s language, “derives independent 
economic value,” which some commentators found confus-
ing,157 and adopting, instead, the phrase, “is sufficiently se-
 
150. Id. at 1321. 
151. 875 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
152. Id. at 463. 
153. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 2(d) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990); see Gillis Assoc. Indus. Inc. v. Cari-All, Inc., 564 
N.E.2d 881, 885 (Ill. App. Ct.) (noting that customer list of 3,000 names was type 
of information that the Illinois Act was intended to protect), appeal denied, 571 
N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1990). 
154. Jager, supra note 32, at 18. 
155. Id. 
156. See, e.g., Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d at 216; IDS 
Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Smithson, 843 F. Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting the eco-
nomic value of confidential information regarding clients). 
157. Jager, supra note 32, at 20; Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 65. 
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cret to derive economic value.”158  In so doing, the Illinois 
legislature enacted a law that focuses on the relative secrecy 
of the particular information.159  Accordingly, the Illinois 
Act’s definitions generally strengthen and clarify trade se-
cret protection.160 
The Illinois Act also contains modifications from the 
UTSA  regarding equitable relief and damages.  First, the Il-
linois Act grants judges greater discretion in determining 
how long an injunction will last.161  While the UTSA requires 
that an injunction terminate when a trade secret ceases to ex-
ist, the Illinois Act allows a judge to determine when an in-
junction will end.162  The Illinois Act also provides additional 
examples of situations in which an injunction should be is-
sued,163 and provides that a reasonable royalty may be or-
dered in lieu of an injunction when public interest so re-
quires.164 
One aspect in which the language of the Illinois Act and 
 
158. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 2(d) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990); see also Jager, supra note 32, at 20. 
159. Jager, supra note 32, at 20; see IDS Fin. Servs., 843 F. Supp. at 418 (noting 
the economic value of confidential information regarding clients); George S. May 
Int’l Co. v. International Profit Assocs., 628 N.E.2d 647, 653 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(reasoning that a trade secret imparts economic value to both its owner and his 
competitors). 
160. Jager, supra note 32, at 18-20. 
161. Bostajancich & Smart, supra note 148, at 863-64; see Stampede Tool Ware-
house, 651 N.E.2d at 217-18 (holding that a four year injunction against former 
employees was proper). 
162. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 3 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 2, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990); see PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that a six-month injunction against an employee who went to 
work for a competitor was appropriate). 
163. These added examples include:  for “deterrence of willful and mali-
cious misappropriation, or where the trade secret ceases to exist due to the fault 
of the enjoined party or others by improper means.”  ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, 
para. 3.  Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 3 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 
2, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
164. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 3(b).  This language more closely paral-
lels the 1979 version of the UTSA than the more stringent 1985 version.  Compare 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 3 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 433 
(1990) and UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (1980). 
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the 1979 version of the UTSA sharply diverge is damages.165  
While the first two sentences of the Illinois Act track the 
meaning of the 1979 version of the UTSA, the third sentence 
provides for a reasonable royalty where the plaintiff is un-
able to prove misappropriation by a preponderance of the 
evidence.166  There is an important distinction between the 
common law principles for damages and the provisions of 
the Illinois Act and the 1985 version of the UTSA.167  The 
common law provided that damages may be granted in ad-
dition to or in lieu of injunctive relief.168  However, an injunc-
tion is the only way to effectively preserve an owner’s prop-
erty right.169  An award of damages in lieu of an injunction 
would allow a trade secret misappropriator merely to pay a 
fine and then to continue using the trade secret.170  There-
fore, the 1985 version of the UTSA and the Illinois Act close 
this loophole by separately providing for injunctive relief 
and damages.171 
Finally, the Illinois Act and the UTSA also differ concern-
ing the statute of limitations for trade secret misappropria-
tion.172  While the UTSA provides for a three-year limitation, 
the Illinois Act adopts a five-year period.173Although this is 
not a major difference, the additional two years will allow 
trade secret owners more time to bring their claims. 
 
165. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 76-77. 
166. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 4 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 3, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990) and UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1980); 
see also Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 77. 
167. Jager, supra note 32, at 21. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984)). 
170. Id. at 21. 
171. See id. 
172. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 7 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 6, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
173. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1065, para. 7 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 6, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
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2. Alabama Trade Secret Law 
Like Illinois, the state of Alabama adopted a trade secret 
act in 1987.174  However, unlike Illinois and most other 
states, the Alabama Trade Secrets Act (“Alabama Act”)175 is a 
significant departure from the UTSA.176  Prior to adopting 
the Alabama Act, Alabama courts recognized the Restate-
ment provisions on trade secret law.177  Although the Ala-
bama Act is unique, the advisory committee that formulated 
the statute borrowed significantly from both the Restatement 
and the UTSA.178 
Structurally, the Alabama Act is set up differently than 
the UTSA.179  While the UTSA is divided into six main sec-
tions,180 the Alabama Act consists of four.181  Section 2 of the 
Alabama Act defines trade secret, person, and those actions 
which constitute improper means.182  Section 3 defines mis-
appropriation,183 section 4 contains the corresponding reme-
dies,184 and Section 5 codifies the statute of limitations.185 
Beginning with the definition of a trade secret, the Ala-
 
174. ALA. CODE § 8-27 (1993 & Supp. 1996). 
175. Id. §§ 8-27-1 to -6. 
176. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 52.  Both the Alabama and North 
Carolina trade secret statutes are substantially different from the UTSA.  Id. 
177. See, e.g., Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1983) 
(citing the Restatement and recognizing the tort of trade secret misappropria-
tion). 
178. Thad G. Long, The Alabama Trade Secrets Act, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 557, 557, 
560-61 (1988). 
179. Compare ALA. CODE § 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 
1-7, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
180. The six main sections are:  section 1—definitions, section 2—injunctive 
relief, section 3—damages, section 4—attorney’s fees, section 5—preservation of 
secrecy, and section 6—statute of limitations.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-6, 14 
U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
181. The four main sections of the Alabama Act are:  definitions, misappro-
priation, remedies, and statute of limitations.  ALA. CODE § 8-27-2 to -5; Long, su-
pra note 178, at 561. 
182. ALA. CODE § 8-27-2. 
183. Id. § 8-27-3. 
184. Id. § 8-27-4. 
185. Id. § 8-27-5. 
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bama Act combines principles from the Restatement and the 
UTSA with additional language, resulting in a more narrow 
version of the UTSA definition.186  Specifically, the Alabama 
Act requires that there be at least an “intention to use the se-
cret in trade or business.”187  There is also a restrictive “em-
bodiment limitation,”188 which effectively eliminates abstract 
ideas from trade secret status.189  Furthermore, the Alabama 
Act requires a trade secret to have “significant” value, 
whereas the UTSA requires only “independent economic 
value, actual or potential.”190  Thus, the Alabama Act pro-
vides a finely etched definition that eliminates frivolous 
claims of misappropriation.191 
Section 2 also contains the “improper means” definition 
that is modified somewhat from the UTSA.192  The Alabama 
Act excludes the UTSA’s broadly worded, “espionage 
through electronic or other means,” and instead proscribes, 
“[o]ther deliberate acts taken for the specific purpose of gain-
ing access to the information of another by means such as 
electronic, photographic, telescopic, or other aids to enhance 
normal human perception, where the trade secret owner rea-
 
186. Compare § 8-27-2(1) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 
(1990) and RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 757; see Randall Scott Hetrick, Employee 
“Head Knowledge” and the Alabama Trade Secrets Act, 47 ALA. L. REV. 513, 522, 526 
(1996). 
187. ALA. CODE § 8-27-2; see Public Sys. v. Towry, 587 So.2d 969, 973 (Ala. 
1991) (holding that a client list is not a trade secret where the company openly 
advertises its client list); Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So.2d 33, 36 (Ala. 1991) 
(denying trade secret protection for customer and vendor lists where the com-
pany did not take adequate steps to ensure confidentiality). 
188. ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1).  This element of the definition requires the trade 
secret to be more than an abstract idea, but actually “embodied in a formula, pat-
tern, compilation, computer software, drawing, device, method, technique or 
process.”  Id. 
189. Id.; see Hetrick, supra note 186, at 524, 534 (distinguishing tangible lists 
from abstract knowledge). 
190. Hetrick, supra note 186, at 534; ALA. CODE § 8-27-2(1); UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
191. See Long, supra note 178, at 562-66; Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, 
at 65-66. 
192. ALA. CODE § 8-27-2. 
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sonably should be able to expect privacy.”193  This change 
prevents the application of the Alabama statute in some 
situations, such as casual observations in the everyday 
workplace, which would constitute improper means under 
the UTSA.194 
Section 3 of the Alabama Act, which covers misappro-
priation, is intended to codify the common law principles of 
the Restatement.195  However, unlike the Restatement and 
the UTSA, the Alabama Act provides no recourse against an 
innocent recipient of a trade secret.196  In contrast, the UTSA 
defines misappropriation as including mistaken disclosure, 
where the recipient knew or should have known certain in-
formation was a trade secret.197  On balance, the Alabama 
Act’s misappropriation section is more restricted than the 
UTSA and the Restatement.198 
In contrast to the previous sections of the Alabama Act, 
Section 4, which provides remedies for misappropriation, 
favors the plaintiff who has established tortious conduct.199  
The Alabama Act provides courts with broad discretion in 
fashioning the equitable relief that “may be appropriate,”200 
including an injunction—perhaps the most important rem-
edy in halting further misappropriation.201  The statutory 
comment to Section 4 also alludes to the possibility of grant-
 
193. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990); ALA. CODE § 8-27-
2(2). 
194. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 56; see Hetrick, supra note 186, at 
523 (discussing Avnet Inc. v. Wyle Labs. Inc., 437 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 1993), where 
the defendant was ordered to turn over all written information). 
195. ALA. CODE § 8-27-3 commissioners’ comment. 
196. Id.; Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 58; see Imed Corp. v. Systems 
Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) (holding a third party liable 
who uses a trade secret and knows it was misappropriated). 
197. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
198. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 59. 
199. Long, supra note 178, at 571. 
200. ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(1). 
201. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 69; see Hetrick, supra note 186, at 
525 (comparing the requirements to obtain an injunction under common law and 
the Alabama Act). 
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ing a permanent injunction.202 
In addition to equitable relief, the Alabama Act provides 
for recovery of lost profits, actual damages, and the potential 
for attorney’s fees and exemplary damages.203  The UTSA 
provision for attorney’s fees in egregious situations was a 
remedy unavailable under common law.204  However, the 
Alabama Act went even further than the UTSA by including 
“actual or threatened” misappropriation claims “resisted in 
bad faith.”205  Moreover, the Alabama Act’s exemplary dam-
ages provision prescribes a statutory minimum of $5,000.206  
The statute excludes the UTSA treble damages provision be-
cause of the available statutory minimum.207  Nonetheless, 
the Alabama Act’s exemplary damages provision may prove 
more beneficial in cases where actual damages are small or 
difficult to prove.208 
Finally, the Alabama Act establishes a two-year statute of 
limitations, as opposed to the UTSA’s three-year period.209  
As stated in the statutory comment, the Alabama legislature 
chose a two-year period to conform the statute to other Ala-
bama tort law and to encourage potential litigants to bring 
claims quickly.210  Overall, the Alabama Act is somewhat 
more narrow than the UTSA in defining a trade secret and 
misappropriation, but provides potentially stronger reme-
dies.211 
 
202. ALA. CODE § 8-27-4 comment. 
203. Id. § 8-27-4; see Corson v. Universal Door Sys. Inc., 596 So.2d 565, 570 
(1991) (awarding damages for breach of nonsolicitation agreements). 
204. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 85. 
205. ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(2). 
206. Id. § 8-27-4(3). 
207. Long, supra note 178, at 568. 
208. Id. at 569. 
209. Compare ALA. CODE § 8-27-5 with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6, 14 U.L.A. 
433 (1990). 
210. ALA. CODE § 8-27-5 comment. 
211. Long, supra note 178, at 571. 
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B. Current Trade Secret Law in New York 
New York is one of the few states that has not adopted 
the UTSA.212  In fact, there is no comprehensive statute un-
der New York law covering the complexities of trade secret 
law.213  The few New York statutes that do mention trade se-
crets are primarily concerned with disclosure of secrets 
when public agencies or officials are involved.214  Therefore, 
New York courts continue to rely on the Restatement provi-
sions on trade secret law, combined with the common law 
rules that the state’s courts have developed.215  As a result, 
New York trade secret law mainly consists of case law that 
defines what information qualifies as a trade secret, and how 
a party can protect its trade secrets. 
Recent decisions indicate that New York courts continue 
to adhere to the Restatement’s definition of a trade secret.216  
Nonetheless, commentators note that what exactly consti-
tutes a trade secret is still unclear.217  Some courts consider 
all six factors listed in Section 757 of the Restatement.218  
Other courts only consider certain of these factors important 
 
212. Cundiff, supra note 33, at 34. 
213. HUGH C. HANSEN, NEW YORK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK §§ 
7[5], 2[170-196] (1996). 
214. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3222 (McKinney 1993); N.Y. PUB. OFF. 
LAW § 87 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 805 (McKinney 
1986 & Supp. 1996); see also HANSEN, supra note 213, § 2[170-196]. 
215. Cundiff, supra note 33, at 33-34; HANSEN, supra note 213, § 7[5]. 
216. See, e.g., Ashland Management Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1012-13 
(N.Y. 1993); Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v. Pico, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1982).  This is also true of federal courts applying New York law.  See, e.g., 
Fabkom, Inc. v. R.W. Smith & Assoc., Inc., 1996 WL 531873, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); 
FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam); see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (defining a trade secret un-
der the Restatement). 
217. Steven R. Kramer, Protecting Dissemination of Business Secrets During 
Discovery, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1997, at 24; see also Ashland Management, 624 N.E.2d at 
1012-13 (stating that, although the Restatement has provided general guidance, 
“there is no generally accepted definition of a trade secret” in New York). 
218. See, e.g., United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see 
supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement’s factors). 
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in determining whether information qualifies as a trade se-
cret.219  Still other courts look only to the general definition 
provided in Section 757, while ignoring the Restatement’s 
factors altogether.220  Therefore, the definition of a trade se-
cret varies considerably among New York courts.221 
New York courts often consider the extent of the meas-
ures an entity has taken to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion as an important factor.222  Such measures may include 
both physical and contractual safeguards.223  Physical safe-
guards might include locking information in a secure place, 
strictly monitoring areas containing sensitive information, or 
requiring electronic passwords on computers containing 
proprietary data.224  Contractual safeguards might include 
confidentiality and licensing agreements, both of which al-
low an entity to deliberately reveal the proprietary informa-
tion to certain people, yet impose a duty on such people not 
to reveal the information to non-parties.225  Although New 
York has recognized such a duty in the absence of an express 
contract,226 commentators strongly advise always taking the 
affirmative step of obtaining an express agreement.227 
 
219. See, e.g., Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2d Cir. 
1986); Julie Research Lab., Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng’g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 
513, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in pertinent part, 998 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam). 
220. See, e.g., Shamrock Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc., 808 
F. Supp. 932, 936-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 6 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1993). 
221. See, e.g., IBM, 67 F.R.D. at 46-7 (considering all six factors in the Re-
statement as part of the definition of a trade secret); Shamrock Technologies, 808 F. 
Supp. at 937 (defining trade secret as “whether the manufacturer, by combining 
all of the components, has developed a system or process that affords a competi-
tive advantage”). 
222. Lehman, 783 F.2d at 298-99; Julie Research Lab., 810 F. Supp. at 520. 
223. Cundiff, supra note 33, at 35-38. 
224. Id.; see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 
(D. Del. 1985) (describing the extensive lengths to which the Coca-Cola Company 
goes to protect the formula for its famous beverage). 
225. See Cundiff, supra note 33, at 38-39. 
226. See, e.g., L. M. Rabinowitz & Co., Inc. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). 
227. Cundiff, supra note 33, at 38. 
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Similarly, critics also suggest restrictive covenants to pro-
tect trade secrets.228  New York enforces restrictive covenants 
to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure of trade se-
crets and confidential information.229  New York law re-
quires only that restrictive covenants meet a reasonableness 
standard.230  Therefore, these covenants can be a useful tool 
in protecting trade secrets. 
Despite the various protective measures available to 
maintain secrecy, it is sometimes necessary for a party to re-
sort to litigation to protect its property.231  In New York, it is 
not clear what claims are available for trade secret misap-
propriation.232  Cases have been brought under theories of 
tort law, contract law, or as a breach of fiduciary duty.233 
Likewise, in the absence of codified remedies, the relief 
available to a trade secret owner varies considerably from 
case to case.234  Equitable relief in the form of an injunction is 
often sought to stop further misappropriation.235  The gen-
eral standards regarding injunctions apply, but there is little 
guidance for judges as to when and how long an injunction 
should be imposed.236  The availability of a “lead time” in-
 
228. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 
(N.Y. 1976). 
 229. See Cundiff, supra note 33, at 39. 
230. See ABC v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 367 (N.Y. 1981); Columbia Ribbon & 
Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 369 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1977) (holding noncom-
petition agreements enforceable to the extent necessary to protect the employer 
from unfair competition). 
231. Cundiff, supra note 33, at 39-40. 
232. See id. at 40 (stating that trade secret misappropriation claims are gen-
erally available under tort law and possibly under contract law). 
233. See Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, 479 N.E.2d 236, 237-38 (N.Y. 1985); Julie 
Research Lab., 810 F. Supp. at 517; MILGRIM, supra note 83, § 13.03. 
234. See, e.g., Ashland Management, 624 N.E.2d at 1010-12 (awarding damages 
for lost profits); Henderson v. Rep Tech, Inc., 557 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1990) (holding forfeiture and a permanent injunction to be appropriate 
remedies for trade secret misappropriation). 
235. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (granting a preliminary injunction). 
236. See, e.g., Lumex Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(holding that once trade secret misappropriation is established, irreparable harm 
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junction is also open to speculation.237  This type of injunc-
tion prevents the misappropriator from using trade secrets 
for the length of time it would take to develop the informa-
tion independently.238 
In addition to equitable relief, money damages in the 
form of lost profits and development costs may be available 
for the trade secret owner.239  Regardless of whether the suit 
is based on tort or contract theories, compensatory damages 
are often necessary to make the trade secret owner whole 
again.240  Although the assessment of damages often calls for 
flexibility on the part of the court,241 without statutory guid-
ance, damage awards vary among the courts in New York.242  
Punitive damages, however, are rarely awarded because it 
requires proof of willful and wanton malicious conduct.243  
Lastly, New York trade secret misappropriation claims are 
governed by the three-year statute of limitations for suits 
based on injury to property.244 
 
III. NEW YORK SHOULD ADOPT A VERSION OF THE UTSA 
While New York courts continue to rely on the Restate-
                                                                                                                                  
is presumed). 
237. The Restatement does not provide for a “lead time” injunction and New 
York courts have yet to employ this remedy on their own. 
238. See, e.g., Integrated Cash Management Servs. Inc. v. Digital Transac-
tions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 1990). 
239. Cundiff, supra note 33, at 40. 
240. JAGER, supra note 6, at 182-83. 
241. Id. at 185-86. 
242. See, e.g., Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 158 F.2d 631, 637 
(2d Cir. 1946) (discussing uncertainty concerning the amount of damages); 
Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953) (focusing on the profit made by 
the defendant); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 192 
N.Y.S.2d 102, 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959), aff’d, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1962) (awarding both defendant’s profits and plaintiff’s damages). 
243. See Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 500-01 (N.Y. 1961) (noting that 
punitive damages will be awarded where deliberate misappropriation was calcu-
lated to create harm). 
244. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(4) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1996). 
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ment and common law for guidance on trade secret law,245 
there is a pervasive uncertainty in this area of the law.246  
Trade secret owners, their employees, and the people with 
whom they conduct business are left with anxiety and suspi-
cion regarding the bounds of trade secret law and the reme-
dies available to them.  The widespread adoption of the 
UTSA among the states indicates that the time is ripe for a 
trade secret act in New York.247 
This part advocates that New York should adopt a com-
prehensive trade secret act.  First, this part argues that, in re-
lying on the Restatement and the common law, New York is 
at a disadvantage compared to the majority of states that 
have enacted trade secret legislation.  Second, this part pro-
poses the New York Trade Secret Act, modeled largely on 
the UTSA.  Finally, this part applies the proposed New York 
act to a hypothetical situation to illustrate the value and im-
portance of such legislation. 
A. A Trade Secret Act Will Benefit New York 
There are several important reasons why New York 
should adopt new trade secret legislation.  First, the original 
trade secret principles in the Restatement, which New York 
courts still apply, are simply outdated.248  The writers of the 
Restatement Second chose not to update the original provi-
sions because they decided that trade secret law did not be-
long in the Torts Restatement.249  Although many states con-
 
245. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (outlining the basis of 
trade secret law in New York). 
246. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing the disorgan-
ized state of New York trade secret law due to the absence of a comprehensive 
trade secret legislation). 
247. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority 
of states have adopted some type of trade secret act incorporating the UTSA). 
248. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 53.  The ALI wrote the first Re-
statement in 1939.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939); see supra notes 215-16 
and accompanying text (noting that New York courts apply the Restatement). 
249. See supra note 75 (noting the exclusion of trade secret law from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts). 
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tinue to consult the original Restatement regarding trade se-
cret issues, the majority recognize its limitations and have 
adopted modified versions of the UTSA.250  Continued ad-
herence to the antiquated Restatement will leave New York 
at a distinct disadvantage in facing the problems of our 
modern economy.251 
Rather than leaving trade secret law to the courts and 
common law, the New York State Legislature should take 
the initiative and enact a trade secret statute modeled on the 
UTSA.  Over forty states have already adopted a version of 
the UTSA,252 most of which experimented with various 
modifications to the model.253  New York would have the 
benefit of these states’ experiences, in addition to the UTSA, 
as a guide for formulating its own law.  Moreover, trade se-
cret law fills a gap left in intellectual property law by pro-
tecting innovations that cannot be patented or copy-
righted.254  Trade secret law serves both to maintain 
commercial morality and to encourage innovation and in-
vention.255  Legislation offering vigorous protection for trade 
secrets would not only encourage investment and research 
by current businesses, but also would attract new industries 
to New York State.256 
Reliance on the Restatement and common law in New 
York has created ambiguous trade secret law, leaving trade 
                                                                                                                                  
statement (Second) of Torts). 
250. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 53; see supra note 131 (listing the 
states that have enacted trade secret legislation based on the UTSA). 
251. See Jager, supra note 32, at 18 (noting the importance of trade secret law 
in modern economy); Jager & Cook, supra note 72, at 93. 
252. See supra note 131 (listing the states that have adopted a comprehensive 
trade secret statute). 
253. Pace, supra note 21, at 443-44. 
254. Id. at 428; see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (highlighting the 
differences between trade secret law and other intellectual property law). 
255. Jager, supra note 32, at 18; see supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text 
(discussing the policies underlying trade secret law). 
256. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting the economic value of 
vigorous trade secret protection). 
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secret owners uncertain of the protection available for their 
property.257  This ambiguity is largely a result of the Re-
statement’s use as merely a guide, and that without a trade 
secret statute, New York courts have broad discretion in de-
ciding what qualifies as a trade secret and the remedies 
available for misappropriation.258  Furthermore, the Re-
statement itself is not comprehensive and is often unclear.259  
In particular, the Restatement does not clearly define a trade 
secret, as the UTSA does, but rather merely lists certain fac-
tors to be considered.260  Additionally, the Restatement nei-
ther explains the phrase “improper means,” nor provides a 
statute of limitations.261  A comprehensive trade secret stat-
ute would eliminate most of these ambiguities, providing 
trade secret owners with greater certainty regarding their 
rights and duties. 
B. A Proposed New York Trade Secret Act 
The following is a suggested New York Trade Secret Act 
(“NYTSA”).  It is largely based on the UTSA, but incorpo-
rates some useful modifications that other states have em-
ployed in formulating their own trade secret statutes. 
THE NEW YORK TRADE SECRET ACT 
§ 1. Definitions. 
 
257. See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text (explaining the unset-
tled status of New York trade secret law). 
258. For example, there is much debate within New York and among other 
states as to when customer lists qualify for trade secret protection.  See JAGER, su-
pra note 6, at 28; see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing the 
differences between Wisconsin and Pennsylvania law). 
259. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 53; see supra notes 91-97 (noting 
the shortcomings of the Restatement). 
260. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939) with UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990); see supra notes 80-82 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Restatement’s definition of a trade secret). 
261. Long, supra note 178, at 558; see supra notes 91-97 and accompanying 
text. 
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As used in this Act, unless the context requires other-
wise:  
(1) “Improper means” includes theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other 
means. 
(2) “Misappropriation” means:  (i) acquisition of a trade 
secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to 
know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; 
or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without 
express or implied consent by a person who (A) used im-
proper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
(B) at the time of disclosure of use, knew or had reason to 
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived 
from or through a person who had utilized improper means 
to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to 
a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived 
from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) 
before a material change of his or her position, knew or had 
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge 
of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. 
(3) “Person” means a natural person, corporation, busi-
ness trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint ven-
ture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or 
any other legal or commercial entity. 
(4) “Trade secret” means information, including a for-
mula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, tech-
nique, or process, that:  (i) derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to 
the public or to other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of ef-
forts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy. 
§ 2. Injunctive Relief. 
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(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be en-
joined.  Upon application of the court, an injunction shall be 
terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the 
injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable 
period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage 
that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation. 
(b) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may con-
dition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for 
no longer than the period of time for which use could have 
been prohibited.  Exceptional circumstances include, but are 
not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position 
prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misap-
propriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable. 
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to pro-
tect a trade secret may be compelled by court order. 
§ 3. Damages. 
(a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial 
change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to 
know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery in-
equitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for 
misappropriation.  Damages can include both the actual loss 
caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment 
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in 
computing actual loss.  In lieu of damages measured by any 
other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation 
may be measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable 
royalty for a misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or 
use of a trade secret. 
(b) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the 
court may award exemplary damages in an amount not ex-
ceeding twice any award made under subsection (a) but not 
less than $5,000.00. 
§ 4. Attorney’s Fees. 
If (i) a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, (ii) 
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a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in 
bad faith, or (iii) willful and malicious misappropriation ex-
ists, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party. 
§ 5. Statute of Limitations. 
An action for misappropriation must be brought within 3 
years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the ex-
ercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.  
For purposes of this section, a continuing misappropriation 
constitutes a single claim. 
§ 6. Effect on Other Law. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act dis-
places conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this 
State providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a 
trade secret. 
(b) This Act does not effect:  (1) contractual remedies, 
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade se-
cret; (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misap-
propriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal remedies, 
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade se-
cret. 
 
The immediate benefit of the NYTSA is the clarity pro-
vided by codified definitions and prescribed remedies.  The 
NYTSA provides owners of trade secrets with a better un-
derstanding about both what property is protectable as a 
trade secret and how to protect it.262  Furthermore, the pro-
posed act elucidates the responsibilities and potential liabili-
ties for employees of trade secret owners and the people 
with whom they conduct business.263  Thus, the act provides 
 
262. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing the unsettled 
status of the trade secret definition in New York). 
263. See supra notes 222-30 and accompanying text (discussing the various 
protective measures currently utilized to protect trade secrets in New York). 
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equitable treatment for all parties concerned. 
In addition to supplying much needed precision, the act 
adds New York to the long list of other states that have al-
ready enacted trade secret legislation.264  This furthers uni-
formity and provides a signal to business and industry that 
New York provides favorable protection for this form of in-
tellectual property.265  Understandably, many companies are 
concerned about trade secret litigation.266  Greater clarity in 
this field results in more efficient use of legal resources and 
potentially reduces litigation expenses.267  Lastly, the exis-
tence of statutory bounds is a useful guide and reduces some 
of the wide discretion courts enjoyed in this area of the 
law.268 
Drawing on the experiences of other states, the proposed 
NYTSA incorporates a few changes to the UTSA.  The first 
modification is to the definition of a trade secret where the 
words “and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means” are omitted.269  This phrase was deleted by the Cali-
fornia legislature when adopting its own version of the 
UTSA in 1984.270  Deleting these words clarifies the level of 
secrecy required and broadens the ambit of the definition.271  
Eliminating this phrase also vitiates the defense that, despite 
the use of improper means, the misappropriator could have 
 
264. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (enumerating the states that 
have already enacted a comprehensive trade secret statute). 
265. See supra notes 69 and accompanying text (highlighting the economic 
importance of trade secret protection). 
266. See Kramer, supra note 217, at 24 (discussing litigation of trade secret 
cases in New York, particularly at the pre-trial stage). 
267. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (noting the uncertainties 
of litigation in New York). 
268. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing the broad 
discretion afforded courts in New York regarding the definition of a trade se-
cret). 
269. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). 
270. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1996); see supra note 103 
(providing the definition of a trade secret under the UTSA). 
271. See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 54-57. 
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learned the secret through proper means.272  This deletion is 
an improvement on the UTSA because it strengthens the 
definition of a trade secret and furthers the underlying pur-
pose of trade secret protection.273 
The other change incorporated in the NYTSA is Ala-
bama’s unique approach to exemplary damages.274  Combin-
ing the UTSA’s provision for a maximum of twice the dam-
ages under section (a) with Alabama’s statutory minimum of 
$5,000 creates a range of potential damages.275  This creates 
the two-fold effect of limiting excessive awards while avoid-
ing the possibility of nominal exemplary damages.276  This 
range of damages also gives some teeth to the statute and 
enforces the notion that trade secrets are valuable property. 
C. Application of the Proposed Act 
Applying the NYTSA to a hypothetical case highlights 
the benefits of adopting the act.  Assume that X Inc. (“X”) is a 
company that develops state-of-the-art software packages 
for a variety of applications.  Also assume that one of X’s 
employees, Ms. Holmes, recently left the company to work 
for a competitor, Z Inc. (“Z”).  Ms. Holmes is a computer en-
gineer who previously worked in X’s research and devel-
opment department.  While working at X, Ms. Holmes had 
access to many of the new projects then being developed.  
Presently, Z begins selling a new software package that has 
striking similarities to work being done at X.  X suspects that 
its research was misappropriated and plans to bring a civil 
suit against Ms. Holmes and Z under the NYTSA. 
 
272. Id. at 65. 
273. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that broad trade secret 
protection benefits commerce and encourages research and development). 
274. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Alabama 
Act’s damages provision). 
275. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990); ALA. CODE § 8-27-
4(3); see supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. 
276. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 121, at 82; see supra notes 206-08 and ac-
companying text. 
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Before X files suit, the NYTSA provides all three parties 
with immediate benefits.  Concrete, statutory definitions of 
what constitutes a trade secret and misappropriation gives 
all three parties a better idea of their positions, and clarifies 
the issues at stake.277  In some New York cases interpreting 
the definition of a trade secret, courts have considered all of 
the factors provided in the Restatement.278  However, other 
courts have taken a less stringent approach and have merely 
relied on the general definition of a trade secret in the Re-
statement.279 
Assuming X proceeds with its case, the discovery stage in 
litigation will be of great concern to the trade secret own-
ers.280  Throughout the case, both X and Z will not want to 
disclose their trade secrets, particularly because they are 
competitors.281  Although the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (“FRCP”)282 and New York’s Civil Practice Law and 
Rules (“CPLR”)283 provide qualified protection for trade se-
crets,284 there is much uncertainty as to what information 
should be protected.285  The three requirements a party must 
meet to obtain an order of protection are:  (1) that the subject 
matter is a trade secret; (2) that disclosure of the subject mat-
ter would result in a cognizable harm; and (3) that the mov-
ing party demonstrates good cause.286  Although the pro-
 
277. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing alternate ap-
proaches taken by New York in defining a trade secret). 
278. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
280. Kramer, supra note 217, at 24. 
281. See id. (noting that maintenance of trade secrets is vital to a company’s 
survival). 
282. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(c)(7). 
283. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3103(c) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1996). 
284. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(c)(7) (providing that the court “may make any or-
der . . . [to protect] a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information”); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3103(c) (indicating that a court 
may suppress improperly obtained information). 
285. Kramer, supra note 217, at 24. 
286. Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.R.D. 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying an or-
der of protection for scientific information because the moving party failed to 
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posed NYTSA does not include discovery rules, its precise 
definition of a trade secret may clarify the information that 
can be protected in the discovery stage of litigation. 
Finally, if X does prevail, the injunctive relief and dam-
ages provisions of the NYTSA will be of assistance.  The Re-
statement and the common law provide even less guidance 
concerning the remedies available to trade secret owners.287  
Leaving remedies to the broad discretion of the court only 
leads to inconsistent results among jurisdictions.  However, 
by codifying definite remedies, the NYTSA gives substance 
to this vital area of trade secret law.  For example, one valu-
able feature available under Section 2 of the NYTSA is a lead 
time injunction.  Moreover, the statutory minimum provided 
in Section 3(b) of the NYTSA may be important if it is diffi-
cult for X to prove damages.288 
CONCLUSION 
Trade secret law, although once relegated as a backdrop 
to patent law, is of growing importance.  Like other forms of 
intellectual property, this field fosters development of new 
technology and products by protecting one’s work product.  
In particular, trade secret law maintains standards of com-
mercial morality while encouraging innovation.  The rigid 
requirements in other areas of intellectual property law 
leave many new ideas and innovations unprotected from 
free-riders.  Trade secret law plays an important role by fill-
ing the gaps between patent, trademark, and copyright pro-
tection. 
The widespread adoption of trade secret statutes among 
the states indicates the vital role of trade secret law.  These 
states recognize that today’s sophisticated economy de-
                                                                                                                                  
show good cause). 
287. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (noting the shortcomings 
of the Restatement). 
288. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits 
of the prescribed range of damages in the NYTSA). 
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mands comprehensive trade secret protection.  New York is 
one of the few remaining states that has ignored this de-
mand.  Consequently, New York trade secret law is decid-
edly ambiguous and lags behind other states’ corresponding 
law. 
New York should be prepared to handle our modern, 
evolving economy and offer the same protections that other 
states offer.  Enacting a trade secret statute modeled on the 
UTSA will equip New York to compete and thrive in today’s 
high technology world.  Adoption of such a statute would 
also bring New York more in line with other states’ laws and 
provide much needed clarity in this integral area of intellec-
tual property. 
 
